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Zen Communist: Breyten Breytenbach’s view
from underground
In an interview after his release from prison, Breyten Breytenbach describes himself, at the time he became involved in
underground politics, as a Zen Communist. He returns occasionally to this interaction of Marxist ideas of social revolution and
Buddhist ideas of non-attachment, but never attempts to explain the resulting synthesis systematically. Indeed, for Breytenbach,
being a Zen Communist is to resist systematic positions, to accept contradiction as a constant source of surprise and invention
disruptive of all systematic thought. This paper examines how this interaction of Marxist and Buddhist ideas and practices has
informed Breytenbach’s politics in three contexts: his initial exploration of a radical philosophy of history in his poetry (“Bruin
reisbrief”, “Brown travel letter”); his role in the underground politics of Okhela in the 1970s; his reflections on politics and social
change in his prison and prison-related writings. Key words: Zen communism, anti-apartheid movement, liberation, dialectic.
“Not such a contradiction as all that”
Around the time that Breyten Breytenbach became active in revolutionary politics, he
also immersed himself in Zen Buddhism. Years later, imprisoned for terrorism in
Pretoria, he recalled how, after making the vows of a bodhisattva in Paris, “a lock of
hair was ceremoniously snipped off ” and explained: “It’s a cleansing process, a cast-
ing off of dead matter, a mental undressing, a way of taking leave of the world and
becoming strong by making yourself vulnerable” (Confessions, 197).1
Later still, after his release from prison, Breytenbach reflected on this apparently
paradoxical commitment:
To be a Zen Communist seems a contradiction, or at any rate peculiar – I believe I
was the only clandestine activist in my dojo, I know I was the only Zen student in
Okhela. But it’s not such a contradiction as all that. The concreteness, shying away
from abstractions, not manipulating facts or other people, forswearing personal
ambition, attentiveness, awareness – all these are functional political precepts (We-
schler 1998: 155).
Breytenbach describes himself as a Zen Communist only at that moment of his life,
during the early 1970s, and he offers the description only in passing. But the figures
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of Buddha and Marx are often placed together in his writings. “Not only Marx,” he
wrote in 1969, “but already old Buddha and so many others before him in the bottom-
less mirror of time, have pointed out that people are bound to the results of their acts
and omissions” (End Papers, 123). And in 1990: “Buddha helped me to understand
Marx”; the Middle Way contains “the kernel of a dialectic encompassing continuous
movement and engagement, for you can be neutral and unattached only if you are
completely part of the process” (Memory of Birds, 36).
Even if it was only at that moment that Breytenbach actively sought to be a Zen
communist, there is a sense in which the whole trajectory of his thought is informed
by themes from Zen Buddhism and from Marxism, by the peculiar attraction and
tension between them, and by the way in which that political identity had become
imaginable to him once. Breytenbach’s later critique of underground politics did not
abandon the aspiration that led him into the underground.
On the one hand, he recollects the life of the underground activist as a “clean form
of political activity, divested of the more mundane horse-trading and compromise of
everyday politics,” which allows a “certain purity of thinking”, and “imposes a rigor-
ous discipline” (Confessions, 81). On the other, he argues that this loss of self often
enables the underground activist to be manipulated in undemocratic and sectarian
ways. The idea that “we can make pure and honest militants” is mistaken. The “liber-
ating concept,” he holds, “is exactly to give over to the people the way a fish gives
itself over to the sea; and also, despite, or because of the watery taste of failure in the
mouth, to continue struggling” (Confessions, 86).
His critique of the underground is a quest for a different kind of underground, an
Archimedean point more simply constituted, not that of clandestine manipulation
but that of “becoming strong by making yourself vulnerable”, finding a still point at
the heart of the world’s restless movement where its deepest aspirations can become
lucid and clear. Rather than seeking to conduct politics in secret, this different kind
of underground (middle world) accepts that social change is the result of processes so
barely perceptible as themselves to be secrets, which guide us even when we do not
entirely grasp their meaning.
For better or worse, being a Zen communist is to follow a way or tao, rather than to
develop a theory or subscribe to a doctrine. It means that political ideas and arguments
must be made real by being lived and by transforming the lives of those who uphold
them, and that their meaning and significance depends on how they are lived.
It should not be held against Breytenbach that he is not a systematic political
theorist. Such theorists all too often find systematic ways of justifying whatever polit-
ical order is currently hegemonic. Breytenbach’s thought moves in different, often
idiosyncratic ways. But his political arguments have been developed, over many
decades, in many genres, and in response to an extraordinary variety of pressures and
circumstances, with a degree of coherence and consistency, originality and imagina-
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tive insight that give him a significant place in the history of South African political
thought.
This article examines Breytenbach’s political and intellectual trajectory from the
perspective of Zen communism. It limits itself mainly to three contexts: his initial
engagement in radical politics, around 1968; his role in the underground politics of
Okhela, leading to his arrest and imprisonment in 1975; and his reflections on politics
and history during and after his years in prison.
It is possible that Breytenbach’s most important contributions to South African
politics were made later, in his critique of the negotiated settlement and his seminal
role in establishing a new politics of Afrikaans. Without grasping the complex devel-
opment of his thought, however, his political responses to post-apartheid South Afri-
ca are all too easily misunderstood. His contemporary political pronouncements are
often seen as a kind of provocation—a disruption of the rules of the political game.
Provocation and disruption may be the result of not understanding the current game
well enough, but also of understanding it all too well.
Paris to Paestum
In a smuggled letter to Marius Schoon, while both of them were prisoners in Pretoria,
Breytenbach wrote that his political schooling – “if any, because I feel that it is only
now that I am outgrowing my child’s shoes […] – was Paris”, that is to say: Vietnam,
May 1968, migrant workers, Tupamaros, Palestine, the revolutionary CP of Brazil.
Much later, he was to describe Paris in 1968: “There were barricades in the street, daily
we battled with riot police […] debate flowed freely among all parts of society […] But
did we not then all believe that a new heaven and new earth were at hand?” (Welz
1977: 117–8).
Breytenbach’s new political commitments were initially explored in his poetry. In
the years after May 1968, the political character of his poetry shifted in several, related
ways. Some poems take sides in the global struggles of the time, where previously he
had focussed on South Africa. Others go further than before in their denunciation of
oppression in general, and capitalism in particular. Among the poems written in
these years, however, “Bruin reisbrief” (“Brown travel letter”) from Oorblyfsels (“Left-
overs”, 1970) seems to me to stand out as capturing a new direction – bringing togeth-
er past and present, local and global, into a reflection on the dialectical patterns of
human history, which is at the same time a sharply focused comment on the struggle
in South Africa. It also sets out his search for a deeper reality underlying political life,
to be found in everyday sights and gestures – an underground created by poetic
remembrance, not political strategy. Coetzee (1990: 45) describes this as “one of the
most memorable documents of political protest in Afrikaans writing”; but it is as
much elegy as protest.
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The poem begins with a journey through the south of Italy, which takes the poet
to Paestum, near Naples, the site of the largest existing Greek temple, where the poem
was written. It describes the efforts of poor farmers, ‘southern people, brown, the
brown of coloureds” – assisted by a “Central Authority” – to “bring this world to its
own feet”. From there the focus shifts to an imagined future in the driest, least hospi-
table parts of South Africa:
[…] And I saw the Karoo come into blossom
its hills anointed with thyme and rosemary
and villages like tendinous knots on the sinews of roads,
I saw water-furrows,
glistening, extended cobwebs across Namaqualand,
with settlements caught in them like flies,
fields of cotton in the valleys,
how even the Kalahari regained a green fertility –
a beautiful country open, open to all its people.
(Ysterkoei-blues, 281–2)2
From there, the poem returns to the Italian landscape, but this time to the ancient past
still visible in the “virile race” which occupies it today. That ancient past and its ideals
had to be “reduced to nothing, in order now, for the first time, to become its fruit.”
What remains of it in the present? “Nothing and everything,” Breytenbach replies,
evoking the lizard and the ant among the classical ruins where peacocks once strutted.
In its fourth and final movement, the poem is addressed to the Afrikaner, the
product of a similar process of historical decomposition and regeneration. For they
now seek to preserve themselves through apartheid, with a logic “like the Greeks
who wanted to found a greater Greece here, and were wiped out by malaria”. The
poem closes in affectionate rebuke of “my brother, my barren, abandoned brother”,
and the wish that he will “blossom in people of brown”. Afrikaners will become
human in their brown descendants, gaining their humanity by abandoning their
futile quest to preserve their supposed racial purity.
The poem draws on many of the existing themes of Breytenbach’s work: death
and decomposition as the source of life and regeneration, self-preservation as a bar-
ren death, the symbiosis of poor farmers with the land, the movement of imagination
from present reality to past prefiguration, etc. But it makes use of these for a different
purpose: that of constructing a dialectical philosophy of history with a political
intent. The force of the poem’s comment on apartheid arises not from the attitude of
the poet, who speaks instead in tones of regret, even longing, but from its integral
relation to the larger historical framework, which informs that comment.
The politics of the poem sits uneasily, however, with its philosophy of history. For
the account of history presented here is that of an ineluctable process, indifferent to
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the ambitions of Greeks and Afrikaners alike. From the point of view, which it adopts,
there need be no significant difference between Pericles and Dr Verwoerd. But the
politics, which grows out of this philosophy of history, takes the form of a moral
appeal to the Afrikaner “brother” – an appeal to transform the pattern, which the
poem suggests, is as ineluctable as death and decay itself. Within the logic of the
poem itself, it is not clear that this can be done. What can be done is not to change the
course of history, but to make peace with it, to discover new aspects of the self by
acting in harmony with the historical process, and to prevent the needless destruc-
tion which those with ambitions of immortality – Greek and Afrikaner alike – visit on
themselves and others. But if this is the argument of the poem, it might as easily be the
basis for an abandonment of politics.
In this ambiguity, the politics of the poem are strongly reminiscent of the leading
Afrikaner revolutionary of the previous generation, Bram Fischer. Fischer’s speech
from the dock, at his trial only two years before Breytenbach’s poem, set out a relative-
ly determinist account of history clearly drawn from Soviet Marxism. But it gave two
inflections of its own to that model of history. First, it suggested as the motive force for
historical change ethical need, rather than material production:
Political changes […] occur when the outmoded political form ceases to serve the
needs of the people who live under the new circumstances brought about by the
development of the new economic methods […] Once the economic changes have
occurred, the political changes are bound to follow […] South Africa today is a clear
example of a society in which the political forms do not serve the needs of most of
the people (Fischer 1966: 14–5).
Second, Fischer’s Marxism lacked any conception of conflict as a necessary part of the
historical process. The overthrow of capitalism can take place peacefully or violently,
he held, depending on “the circumstances at any given stage of history” (Fischer
1966: 13). In this context, the role of Marxism was not to clarify the lines of struggle, but
to pre-empt it. For once political change has become inevitable, “the sole question is
whether […] the political changes will be affected by peaceful means or by violence
and this depends in essence on the balance of forces at the time when the changes
come and on the degree to which people understand the need for political change”
(Fischer 1966: 23). Marxism is presented as the source of such understanding, that
which enables contending groups “to get together and work out by discussion, and
not by violence, a method whereby they can live together”. Fischer’s own sacrifice is
made, then, to avoid a repetition of “that unnecessary and futile anguish” which was
suffered during the South African War (Fischer 1966: 16).
The perspectives of Fischer and Breytenbach resemble each other in combining a
philosophy of history which leaves little room for human agency with an ethical
appeal to Afrikaners to conform to the course of history rather than resisting it. But
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Fischer’s conception of the course that will be taken by history is relatively abstract. It
is a linear and stagist conception in which the more advanced mode of production,
and its corresponding form of state, displaces the outdated mode, and the Soviet state
provides a model and end-point for the process.
In Breytenbach’s poem, by contrast, the historical process is richly concrete, the
outcome of the tenacity and passion of poor people – “the further south you go, the
poorer the farmers become” – and the imaginative feat which makes green and
fertile the Kalahari Desert itself. Rather than a relentless march through the stages of
history, there is a dialectical sense of the tragic ambiguity of even the most single-
minded projects, and a vivid sense of how coming to self-understanding is also a
way of preparing for death. Fischer ’s account of history stands in the place of his-
torical and philosophical enquiry, leaving him only to take his stand – and the
heroism of the stand he takes cannot be doubted – for the cause which it vindicates.
Breytenbach’s account of history offers no pre-determined outcome. Every histori-
cal order contains the seeds of its own eventual demise, but this does not detract
from the reality of its human achievements. The poem is a signpost, of startling
clarity, of the road which was not to be taken by Breytenbach or by any of his
contemporaries.
In a long poem, Kouevuur (“Cold Fire” / “Gangrene”) written in the European
winter of 1968–9, Breytenbach (Ysterkoei-blues, 205) revisited the grave where the poem,
which had introduced his work, four or five years before described his own burial.
When the grave was opened, a flower is discovered growing from the anus of the
corpse, on which is transcribed Marx’s account of the ceaseless self-criticism of prole-
tarian revolution, taken from The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon (the poem
quotes Marx’s text in English). The quotation concludes with Marx’s play on Hegel’s
aphorism from the Philosophy of Right: “hic Rhodus, hic salta”. It is as if Breytenbach
takes the work of revolutionary self-criticism to be completed. The time for his own
leap has come. Soon after that, Breytenbach entered the very different world of un-
derground activism, after being recruited in an ANC-aligned group in 1969. Thereaf-
ter his writings put forward a conception of history much closer to that of Fischer,
and to the Soviet Marxism which had been so resoundingly rejected on the streets of
Paris in May 1968.
Okhela’s contradictions
For a South African in exile, being radicalized in the context of the Paris revolts of 1968
had considerable consequences. The politics of the South African liberation move-
ment in exile were dominated by the South African Communist Party, which stood at
the opposite end of the spectrum of left politics from Breytenbach and the revolution-
aries of 1968.
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Breytenbach has given several accounts of his entry into underground politics. In
all of these accounts, a central role was played by Johnny Makatini, at that time the
ANC’s diplomatic representative in Algiers “from where he oversaw anti-apartheid
activities in France” (Paradise, 122). This oversight was contested by the London office
of the ANC which – according to Makatini and Breytenbach – was dominated by the
SACP, which in turn had a very close relationship with the French Communist Party.
Atlas/Okhela focussed mainly on exposing European collaboration with apart-
heid, enforcing trade sanctions and the like. But Makatini believed that it could take
on a larger political role within the liberation movement, as a counterweight to the
influence of the SACP. He persuaded the president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, to meet
Breytenbach, and to give his sanction to the formation of Okhela. Where Atlas had
been a small clandestine group engaged in anti-apartheid activities in France, Germa-
ny and the Netherlands, Okhela would be a pole of attraction for white leftists within
South Africa – more specifically, for radical students, organisers in the emerging
trade union movement, and dissident Afrikaner intellectuals. A major part of Breyten-
bach’s clandestine mission to South Africa was to discuss the draft manifesto of Okhe-
la with potential recruits.
Okhela was at cross-purposes with itself even before it came into existence. Makati-
ni, Tambo and Breytenbach all had significantly different purposes in establishing it,
and the area at which these intersected was obscure and changeable. Makatini was
aligned with the “Africanists” within the ANC, who were resentful of the opening to
all races of ANC membership (but not membership of its National Executive) at the
Morogoro conference in 1969, and of the influence of the SACP, which they saw as the
main force behind the adoption by the ANC of the explicitly anti-capitalist “strategy
and tactics”. He saw Okhela as a way of reducing the role of the SACP, and limiting
the role of white leftists in the liberation movement to that of “support work in their
own community” (Callinicos 1999: 134).
Although Tambo sought at that time to accommodate the Africanist group within
the ANC, there is no evidence that he supported their cause. During the years in exile,
Tambo’s aim was to build as inclusive a movement as possible, and this was almost
certainly his aim in initially giving his approval to the formation of Okhela. Finally,
Breytenbach and his comrades sought to reduce the role of the SACP for very differ-
ent reasons from Makatini. “Due to diverse leftist experiences during the sixties”, he
wrote (another shorthand for “Paris 1968”), “they felt a strong opposition to Stalin-
ism” – that is, to the doctrinaire, bureaucratic and centralist line of the SACP. While
they shared the SACP’s commitment to creating a non-racial South Africa, they also
felt that the SACP was “papering over the real problems of cultural awareness” and
failing to learn the lessons of Black Consciousness (Confessions, 76). Callinicos (1999:
135) describes Atlas/Okhela as “a white, New Left alternative to the SACP, operating
within the ambit of the ANC”. The characteristic critique made by New Left Marxism
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of dogma and hierarchy had little in common with an Africanism concerned to pro-
mote a new dogma and new faces within the old – although racially restricted –
hierarchy of the liberation movement.
Breytenbach (Welz 1977: 117) emphasised – both in his smuggled correspondence
with Marius Schoon and in his published account – that the critique of the SACP
which motivated Okhela was “coming from the left”. He told Schoon that his com-
rades were “Marxists and revolutionaries (and also not Trotskyists, although there
were some Maoist tendencies to be detected)”. Faced with Schoon’s unflinching loy-
alty to the SACP, he still hazarded that “there are quite good South African commu-
nists outside the SACP” (Welz 1977: 126). In developing its own strategies, Okhela
gave priority to support for the emerging trade union movement, which was dis-
missed by the exiled South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and was to be
subjected to sustained hostility from the SACP once it came to adopt a political direc-
tion of its own.
But Breytenbach’s self-definition as an anti-Stalinist “to the left of the SACP” was
largely retrospective. During his years of clandestine activism, Breytenbach’s politi-
cal vocabulary was very similar to that of the Soviet Marxism, although juxtaposed
with relatively undeveloped suggestions of a less centralised, more flexible approach.
Breytenbach’s ambivalence is captured in a 1972 discussion paper “contributing some
elements towards a strategy for revolution in South Africa”, which is in many ways a
precursor to the Okhela manifesto. According to the paper, “our ultimate objective is
a Socialist South Africa” in which a “new man” will come into being after “a taking of
power by those who genuinely represent the workers and the peasants” (End Papers,
66). After setting out the complexities of the South African social order, the paper calls
for a regrouping of “progressive elements, even those outside the liberation move-
ment, into a revolutionary avante-garde, which will be closely, organically linked to
the masses, work within the mass movements, learn from the people, help the mass
organisations and the Liberation Movement in particular to evolve a clear strategy for
revolution” (End Papers, 68).
This is the central ambivalence of the politics of Okhela: on the one hand, they
acknowledge a well-defined “liberation movement” (the ANC and its allies); on the
other, they assume it does not yet have a “clear strategy for revolution”. A few
paragraphs later, it recurs: “We must redefine, if necessary, the programme of the
Liberation Movement” (End Papers, 69). But still there is no account of what its
programme is, nor what problems require its redefinition, nor why this task should
be assigned to Okhela. Breytenbach’s own account of the nature of the South Afri-
can struggle generally stays close to that of the ANC and SACP, asserting the theory
of internal colonialism in more or less orthodox form, but adding that black con-
sciousness is also a “necessary rehabilitatory answer to cultural colonialism” (End
Papers, 67–8).
02 Nash 02.pmd 6/23/2009, 9:48 PM18
TYDSKRIF VIR LETTERKUNDE • 46 (2) • 2009 19
The paper concludes: “The Liberation Movement must head the working alliance
of Black Workers, of exponents of Black Consciousness, the Church leaders and the
White Radicals, and reflect the struggle at any level at which it expresses itself” (End
Papers, 70). This is to accept the leadership of a liberation movement and at the same
time to dictate that it must ally itself with its rivals; to accept the idea of a “head” for
that alliance, which provides its centralised planning and direction, and at the same
time to juxtapose with it the very different idea that struggle should be “reflected at
whatever level it expresses itself ” – that is, without regard to the strategy of those at
the “head” of that alliance.
In a paper presented in Groningen in the same year, Breytenbach (End Papers, 251)
sets out the conception of history underlying this political perspective, arguing that
“there is a dynamic evolution which contains jumps and advances in quality accord-
ing to an ever-ascending spiral. Struggles reach certain levels, contradictions are
seemingly resolved and new ones created. In this universe the tension between the
two opposites of a contradiction is the force that allows societies to progress”. It is in
the name of progress – conceived as a continuous and linear process – that struggle,
conflict and resistance are made necessary, in Breytenbach’s argument. The Okhela
manifesto, dated June 1975, brings together this triumphalist conception of dialectic
(“the profound contradictions within South African society must explode […] the
Apartheid state must be destroyed”), with professions of loyalty to the ANC, and the
idea of white radicals within Okhela playing a role “within the national Liberation
Front being constituted” (Confessions, 385, 389).
But the politics of Okhela required not so much immersion into the historical
reality of the South African struggle, but rather an unusually mediated and compli-
cated relationship to that reality. At one and the same time, Okhela had to acknowl-
edge the primacy of the ANC in the liberation movement, contest its alliance with the
SACP, seek to lead a movement of students and workers within South Africa which
was defined largely by its resistance to centralized leadership and to the politics of
national liberation, and draw on white Afrikaner intellectuals to construct a more
revolutionary path for the ANC.
Okhela was held together largely by a kind of voluntarism, exemplified by the
decision to send its best-known and most conspicuous activist on that fateful secret
mission to South Africa in 1975. Breytenbach (Confessions, 80) subsequently explained
his acceptance of the task:
It was not my idea to go down there but I had to submit myself to the majority
decision to do so. Stupidly vain, when told there were certain things which only I
could do, it touched me, and I fell for it […] I felt a moral commitment, a necessity
to go. How could I pretend to lead an organisation of which some members would
have to do dangerous things if I was not willing to do so myself?
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Prison dialectics
Before his illegal visit to South Africa, Breytenbach (Confessions, 139; see Coetzee,
1990: 44) spoke of compiling his final collection of poems, “because I have had my
say”. But imprisonment left him no other identity than that provided by words, and
provoked an outpouring of them. From his release in 1982 until 1989, his prison
writings were published in four volumes of poetry, a novel and a volume of literary
reflection, as well as a prison memoir, a collection of political speeches and papers
and a second novel that were the product of his prison years.
The starting point for Breytenbach’s reflections in prison was a critique of the
central conceptions of his years in Okhela: the idea of discipline, which defined the
underground activist and decided his success or failure; the goal of power, which
justified the sacrifices which the movement demanded; and the ostensible result of
all of this, historical progress. Underground work forges “dedicated revolutionaries”
conditioned into “unquestioned loyalty, discipline”, among whom “relations are
based on rock-bottom needs” (Confessions, 83). These relations are highly structured,
“with information strictly channelled, with walls separating sector from sector, with
a hierarchy that cannot be questioned”. This “makes of underground work a very
undemocratic process and it constitutes a structure which can be a very manoeuvra-
ble vehicle for whoever happens to occupy the central nerve point.” Breytenbach
questions the “romantic view of underground work” and asks: “Has it ever been
successful, apart from, in some instances, making it possible for the clandestine activ-
ist to come to power?” (Confessions, 85).
Discipline is justified by the needs of power. Questioning the cult of discipline
therefore raises the question of whether power is itself the proper goal of the libera-
tion struggle. For Breytenbach (Confessions, 309), it is not: “Power is a totalitarian
concept. To realise that you are marginal is of itself a way of making distance your
own, of becoming as permanent as an ice-block going downstream, of disregarding
coercion. It is to come upon an interstice of freedom.” Putting a new elite in power
does not challenge the conventions of power itself: “Power structures are practically
immutable and when broken down they’re more likely than not to be replaced by
others which are as exclusive and manipulative” (End Papers, 32). The quest for power
in the name of liberation turns into its opposite: “All power needs interaction, rela-
tionships, intercourse […] in order to exist. It is dialectical. You are not fighting ghosts,
but your brothers […] We are linked by our differences” (Memory of Snow, 128).
This leads to a more sceptical approach to the idea of progress. It is a fallacy, he
argues (Confessions, 86), to postulate “that there is a measurable progress in the quality
of human intercourse.” In the life of the mind as in any other, growth and decay are
inextricably linked: “There is no composition like decomposition: not just a rear-
ranging or falling apart, but verily rotting to the bone to bring to light the essential
structure” (Confessions, 151). He comes increasingly to view the linear idea of time as
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common ground for the apartheid regime and the liberation movement in South
Africa. Marxist doctrines of historical determinism have mirrored Calvinist ideas of
predestination. “The Party does not learn from the past, it becomes the recipient, the
guardian of the accumulated weight of the past […] time is an investment […] Marx
will be proved right […] How is this any different from the Afrikaners’ doctrine of
predestination? […] Are we doomed to become imitators of the people we are combat-
ting?” Against Marxist or Calvinist ideas of redemption, he asserts the need to act in
solidarity with the powerless without claiming the force of history on your side: “I
need not believe or trust in the possibility of attaining the objective in order to keep
moving. That would be falling into the progressist trap” (End Papers, 133; italics in the
original).
The “progressist trap” occurs when one holds that progress is unmixed; that tech-
nological progress goes along with moral progress, and that we are justified in over-
looking its human costs. When “political language” overlooks these costs, it makes
itself liable to Breytenbach’s charge (Memory of Birds, 72–3) that “it is never self-doubt-
ing, dark or broken”. He describes his own task, in contrast with the tasks of the
political, as “putting in motion the joyful despair of metamorphosis”.
Having abandoned a linear view of historical progress, Breytenbach argues for a
more conscious and ethical relationship to the passing of time, requiring individu-
als to decide on their role in validating what has gone before them. What is distinc-
tive about Breytenbach’s conception of time is the ethical relationship it establishes
to the past. For the linear conception also claims to make ethical conduct possible in
the present, but does so by treating the past as superseded, and emphasizing the
causal relation of present conduct to the future. Once the linear conception is de-
nied, however, there is no way of discharging your ethical responsibility by being
on the side of the future rather than the past. The past and future are not necessarily
in conflict. When they are, there is no easy resolution to be gained by siding with the
future.
It is possible, for example, to acknowledge a background formed by racial and
other forms of exclusion, and at the same time seek to develop a larger, non-racial
community:
The dialectic between the “own”and the larger togetherness, between the specific
and the general, is creative and progressive and transformative. It is also never-
ending, never resolved once and for all […] What do you take with you of the old
as you go over to the new? […] I know only that I find myself exposed on that edge
of becoming. Consciousness in movement is not a calm sea (Dog Heart, 186).
Instead, “you carry your history with you piece by piece, until it eventually falls to
pieces” (Woordwerk, 202).3 The past has not been completed and left behind; nor does
it provide an eternal and unchanging standard; but the past endures, and imposes on
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us the dialectical task of keeping alive its purposes precisely when they are least
familiar in the light of the present. There is an obligation to resist the “Great Forget-
ting” (Die Groot Vergeet) of consumer culture (Woordwerk, 174).
In a recent work, Breytenbach (Veil, 72) puts this argument in terms that are less
explicitly political and closer to the metaphysics of traditional Buddhism: “Identity
is an ethical journey, a collage of scars and a work in progress spurting from the
original void of ‘self ’, the nothingness called ‘life’ you are left with when you crack
the tiny banyan seed.”
The linear view of historical progress implied by the “ever-ascending spiral” of
Breytenbach’s dialectic during his Okhela years could claim the merit of providing a
common perspective to large numbers of people engaged in a common struggle. To
some extent, very different struggles are welded together by a philosophy of history
capable of interpreting them as parts of a single movement of progress. Within the
ethical relationship to historical time proposed in his prison writings, it is difficult to
see how any such common perspective could emerge. In the work which initiates
Breytenbach’s re-thinking of dialectic – at once an exposition of Zen Buddhism and
an enquiry into the poet’s craft – he asks (Boek, 170–4):
How do you gain access, in all clarity, to the whole within which opposites continue
to exist without disrupting their symbiosis? […] What Buddha proposed is no
more than a method with which one can experiment; it is not a religion, or a
serving of gods who can blindly be accepted once and for all. It must be grasped,
and then constantly questioned […] The key to Buddhist thought is independence
and tolerance.4
Just as denying the linear conception of time establishes a new area of ethical respon-
sibility, so in taking up this responsibility we locate ourselves more fully and firmly
in history. “I’m less of a threat to others when I’m at ease with my own unelucidated
origins,” Breytenbach (Dog Heart, 184) tells (a lightly fictionalised) Ampie Coetzee in
a radio interview. He argues (“Andersheid,” 43): “Ethics is important. If you ‘choose’
who you are, there is a deepened sense of finitude, of beginnings and endings and of
purpose.”5
This argument against the linear movement of history and for more consciously
ethical responsibility towards that which is historically transient is a continuation of
the Zen Buddhist theme of immersion into a process as a mode of political commit-
ment and at the same time a re-working of that theme, which gives much greater
emphasis to the conscious and critical detachment of the individual immersed in the
process, and requires a more active historical sense. Rather than the metaphor of the
fish in water – drawn perhaps from Mao’s writings on people’s war – that of the
desert nomad, who must always move forward, is now more conspicuous (see Dog
Heart, 165, 172).
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Thus, in a context in which history provides no certain direction, “the way for-
ward is to keep moving” (Memory of Birds, 158). When all directions seem to be ob-
structed, “the point is to start anywhere. To continue then in the direction opened by
that start. Whatever the way may be, wherever it may lead […] The method I’ve
decided on is to keep moving” (Memory of Snow, 215). The Middle Way of Buddhism
“embodies the necessity of movement”, not “circumventing and obscuring irrecon-
cilable contradictions” but recognising that “it would be futile to sink into the static
stance of waiting for the opposites to be resolved” (Memory of Birds, 10). The struggle
against apartheid will not necessarily produce a better society, but at least the destruc-
tion of apartheid makes it possible for the other – “maybe better” – to take its place.
For “there is no turning back; there is no self to turn back to” (Confessions, 239–40).
There is no self to turn back to, in the sense of a fixed and stable identity un-
changed by the projects it undertakes. This is a constant theme in Breytenbach’s
writings (Boek, 88): “The self is a hearse. Death is the past, all the mutations of the ‘self ’
which are now left to rot. You are always becoming, only a process.”6 You can turn
back to the self, then, but it will not be the same self that you were when you began
with the project from which you will later wish to turn back. “Memory is Kaggen, the
trickster god. It says there is one certainty: nothing is what it seems. It says there is one
finality: change” (Dog Heart, 188; italics in the original).
To think dialectically, in this context, is to think reflexively; it is to interpret the
world in such a way as to make sense of the struggles of those seeking to change it and
express your solidarity with them, but at the same time to remain aware of how you
are changed by the process. For if the self is no more than the process of change which
results from conscious identification with those struggles, then reflection on the self
is necessarily a mode of thinking about how that solidarity is consistently to be main-
tained. Understood in this way, there is no need to interpret Breytenbach’s account
(Judas Eye, 133) of the task of the writer as inward-looking or apolitical:
Part of the civic poet’s responsibility is to recognise the interstices, to be the thin
wedge that could split the cracks, to seize the distaff elements and the moments of
disequilibrium. He must be able to exploit the dynamic dialectical relationship of
illusion, or appearance, with reality – knowing intimately the myriad ways in
which the one becomes the other.
Increasingly, he views this relationship of illusion and reality as the product of a
specific moment in capitalist development: “We are moving into exciting and fright-
ening times where everything and its exact opposite seem to be true,” he says in 1990
(Hart-lam, 34–5). “We live ever more by the reflection of reality, its staging, rather than
by reality itself. We need to be told what is happening to us and then the telling
becomes more real, is indeed the true happening.” With the coming of liberation,
independence and legitimate government, there is also “a television in every shack
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and pondok to wipe out memory”. The image of the mirror recurs throughout Breyten-
bach’s work, often to convey this effect: “Mirrors have a life of their own, and those
who become trapped in them are doomed to continued existence” (Boklied, 77, 131).7
If the conception of dialectic developed in Breytenbach’s prison years and after is
taken as a whole, it can be seen as an attempt to formulate a discipline of mind
embodying a conception of freedom as rational self-determination. “Power to the
people,” he wrote in a reflection on his talk to the UCT Summer School of 1973,
“means that people are given the resources for self-knowledge, knowledge of the
other (perhaps the same thing), and self-determination. To give the people back to
themselves […] We must still learn who we are; we must still become used to our-
selves” (Seisoen, 134).8 After his release from prison, he told students at Stellenbosch
(“Die game”, 10): “My variant of power to the people is that everyone must think for
himself, and the way I understand respect for my fellow-human is to allow each of
them to think for themselves.”9 A decade or more later, Breytenbach’s tone (“Anders-
heid”, 33) was more sober, but the argument was not fundamentally different: “In my
experience, conscious awareness does not lead to certainty. I am not even so sure that
it produces understanding. But a conscious life is all we have with which to under-
mine death.”10
Underground in the New South Africa?
The most frequent criticism to Breytenbach’s writings since the transition from apart-
heid began in 1990 is captured in his account of an encounter with Albie Sachs: “But
aren’t you ever happy? Now that we’ve won, can’t you rejoice?” (Paradise, 160; italics
in the original). The chance exuberance of a returned exile has become the refrain of
newspaper columnists such as Max du Preez – rejoicing by now through gritted
teeth.
After the release of Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC and other political
organisations, Breytenbach returned to South Africa in August 1990, warning against
the consequences of a victory over apartheid too easily won. In a series of interven-
tions over the following years, he attacked the “false sense of consensus – actively
connived at by the negotiators – namely that we know who we are and where we’re
heading” (Hart-lam, 35). This false consensus stands in the place of free and open
debate about the direction which South African society is to take, and mobilization
around different perspectives; instead, “one sees the participants in the various min-
utes and talks-about-talks-about-talks congregating in a kind of bureaucratic conspir-
acy of mediocre Boere-Stalinism” (Hart-lam, 40). The outcome of their negotiations,
he warns (Hart-lam, 41), will reflect “the interests of two symbiotically dependent
South African political formations which do not, cannot and are not mandated to
represent the majority of us hoi-polloi”.
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The threat of the negotiated settlement, according to Breytenbach’s analysis, is
threefold: conformity of mind; stagnation of identity; continued inequality. “South
Africa’s dominant culture is one of co-optation. There are still too many zones of
silence, of accessory muteness, of reciprocal moral blackmailing living on hereditary
guilt and the need to be humiliated,” he told a Stellenbosch audience in 1990 (Memory
of Birds, 26). South Africa is
caught between the plague and the cholera – between, on the one hand, Apartheid
with its patriarchal and colonial tenets of Christian National Education, accompa-
nying repression and the censoring of dissidence and deviation […] and, on the
other hand, a potential Stalinism, with its cultural commissars enforcing “people’s
culture” as populist idolatry through the appropriate “structures” […] and where
we shall again experience the marginalization of dissidents (Memory of Birds, 149).
In this context, “you need to be bewildered, again and again, until such time as
you”re obliged to think for yourself. If you have to be stupid, at least be so with your
own authentic foolishness” (Memory of Birds, 26).
In this context, reconciliation becomes “the reconciliation of two power machines
– to broaden the base of pork barrel politics” (Hart-lam, 48). The inequalities of the
past would be deracialized, but would continue and prompt new racial conflicts:
“the Mandelas and the Mbekis and the Meyers […] already live hand-in-pocket with
the Oppenheimers and the Motlanas,” while “the rough, white and black, unpoliti-
cized lumpen proletariat” will “take each other on” (Memory of Birds, 145). The “polit-
ical caste” will be guaranteed “untrammelled access to the state’s feeding troughs –
while outside the slaughter continues” (Memory of Birds, 147).
Breytenbach seeks to disrupt the emerging consensus, but does not always make
clear what is supposed to take its place. His most consistent theme is not the need for
a national consensus with a different content, but rather for active exploration of
differences, which does not necessarily have consensus as its aim: “I’d like to put in
my plea for doubt and questioning, diversity, the maintenance of our ‘Ho-Chi-Min
trail’ of underground tunnels of memory and resistance” (Memory of Birds, 149).
For all the power and eloquence of Breytenbach’s interventions in these years,
then, they remain strangely disconnected from the real conflicts of the time. There are
many aspects of the transition to democracy which he foresaw more accurately than
any of his contemporaries. But he could not make of that foresight the basis for any
kind of resistance or opposition, nor has it been incorporated into any line of analysis
– apart from that which has confined itself, self-defeatingly, to the issue of Afrikaans.
For the central contradictions of the new South Africa lie not in the moral failings of
capitalist or would-be capitalist politicians, but in the capitalist order itself. It is not
that those who bring it into being wish to preserve and imitate the pretensions and
habits of mind of the apartheid regime. They have no real alternative but to do so, for
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as long as the new South Africa derives its legitimacy from the democratic support of
the oppressed majority, while carrying out the economic programme which serves
the interests of the privileged minority.
In some measure, this failure can be seen as the product of Breytenbach’s own lack
of connection with the South African Left. After his release from prison, he quickly
became an international celebrity, a prized item in the consumer culture against which
he railed. For some years, he travelled widely in Europe and the United States (End
Papers, 24–6). After 1990, he took on the same status in South Africa, moving “from
airport to dinner table to lecture room” (Paradise, 217). In Zen terms, he acquired the
“smell of enlightenment” (Kapleau 2000: 345), or had it bestowed upon him by the
enlightenment industry in which he has been caught up, perhaps not entirely against
his will.
But this failure cannot be attributed to Breytenbach alone. No one individual can
be held responsible for the failure of a project which could only have been brought to
any kind of completion within a vigorous and coherent culture of the left. Building
such a culture is a collective task, which still lies ahead, beckoning us into the future.
Notes
1. When I cite Breytenbach’s work I use a shortened title of the referenced work.
2. This and all subsequent translations are mine. The original reads: “[. . .] En ek het die Karroo in
bloei sien kom, / sy koppies gesalf met tiemie en roosmaryn / en dorpies soos peesknobels aan die
senings van paaie, / ek het waterslote gesien, / glinsterende uitgebreide spinnedrade oor Namakwa-
land / met die nedersettings soos vlieë daarin verstrik, / landerye katoen in die laagtes, / hoe selfs die
Kalahari weer ’n groen vrugbaarheid kry – / ’n mooi land óóp, óóp vir al sy mense [. . .]” (Ysterkoei-
blues, 281–2).
3. “Mens dra die geskiedenis stuk-stuk met jou saam totdat dit naderhand heeltemal stukkend is”
(Woordwerk, 202).
4. “Hoe verkry jy in alle helderheid toegang tot die geheel waarbinne teenoorgesteldes bly voort-
bestaan sonder dat dit die simbiose van stryk kan bring? [. . .] Wat die Boeddha voorhou is alleenlik
’n metode waarmee geëksperimenteer kan word; dis geen godsdiens of godediens wat eens en vir
altyd blindweg aanvaar kan word nie – dit moet begryp en altyd weer bevraagteken word. [. . .]
Die sleutel tot Boeddhistiese denke is selfstandigheid en verdraagsaamheid” (Boek, 170–4).
5. “Die etiek is belangrik. As jy ‘kies’ wie jy is, is daar ’n verdiepte sin van eindigheid, van beginne en
eindes en van doel” (“Andersheid,” 43).
6. “Die self is ’n lykswa. Die dood is die verlede, is al die mutasies van die ‘self ’ soos hulle nou verrot.
Jy is altyd wording. Slegs ’n proses” (Boek, 88).
7. “En nou het ons televisie in elke shack en pondok om die geheue uit te wis”; “Spieëls het ’n eie
lewe en dit wat daarin verstrik raak, bly gedoem tot voortbestaan” (Boklied, 77, 131).
8. “Daardie ‘power to the people’ beteken vir my dat die volk die middels gegee word tot selfkennis,
kennis van die ander (dis dalk dieselfde ding) en selfbeskikking. To give the people back to
themselves. . . . Ons moet nog leer wat ons is; ons moet aan onsself gewoond raak” (Seisoen, 134).
9. “My variant van power to the people is dat elke ou vir himself moet dink, en my vergestalting van
respek vir my medemens is dat elke ou juis vir himself kán dink” (“Die Game”, 10).
10. “In my ervaring lei bewuswees nie na sekerheid nie. Ek is nie eens so seker dat dit mond op begrip
nie! Maar ’n bewuste lewe is al waaroor ons beskik om die dood te ondermyn”(“Andersheid”, 33).
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